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Making Meaningful Inferences
About Magnitudes
Alan M. Batterham and William G. Hopkins
A study of a sample provides only an estimate of the true (population) value of 
an outcome statistic. A report of the study therefore usually includes an inference 
about the true value. Traditionally, a researcher makes an inference by declaring 
the value of the statistic statistically signifi cant or nonsignifi cant on the basis of a 
P value derived from a null-hypothesis test. This approach is confusing and can 
be misleading, depending on the magnitude of the statistic, error of measurement, 
and sample size. The authors use a more intuitive and practical approach based 
directly on uncertainty in the true value of the statistic. First they express the 
uncertainty as confi dence limits, which defi ne the likely range of the true value. 
They then deal with the real-world relevance of this uncertainty by taking into 
account values of the statistic that are substantial in some positive and negative 
sense, such as benefi cial or harmful. If the likely range overlaps substantially 
positive and negative values, they infer that the outcome is unclear; otherwise, 
they infer that the true value has the magnitude of the observed value: substan-
tially positive, trivial, or substantially negative. They refi ne this crude inference 
by stating qualitatively the likelihood that the true value will have the observed 
magnitude (eg, very likely benefi cial). Quantitative or qualitative probabilities that 
the true value has the other 2 magnitudes or more fi nely graded magnitudes (such 
as trivial, small, moderate, and large) can also be estimated to guide a decision 
about the utility of the outcome.
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Researchers usually conduct a study by selecting a sample of subjects from 
some population, collecting the data, then calculating the value of a statistic that 
summarizes the outcome. In almost every imaginable study, a different sample 
would produce a different value for the outcome statistic, and of course none would 
be the value the researchers are most interested in—the value obtained by studying 
the entire population. Researchers are therefore expected to make an inference about 
the population value of the statistic when they report their fi ndings in a scientifi c 
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journal. In this invited commentary we fi rst critique the traditional approach to 
inferential statistics, the null-hypothesis test. Next we explain confi dence limits, 
which have begun to appear in publications in response to a growing awareness 
that the null-hypothesis test fails to deal with the real-world signifi cance of an 
outcome. We then show that confi dence limits alone also fail and then outline our 
own approach and other approaches to making inferences based on meaningful 
magnitudes.
The Null-Hypothesis Test
The almost universal approach to inferential statistics has been the null-hypothesis 
test, in which the researcher uses a statistical package to produce a P value for an 
outcome statistic. The P value is the probability of obtaining any value larger than 
the observed effect (regardless of sign) if the null hypothesis were true. When P 
< .05, the null hypothesis is rejected and the outcome is said to be statistically 
signifi cant.
In an effort to bring meaning to this deeply mysterious approach, many 
researchers misinterpret the P value as the probability that the null hypothesis 
is true, and they misinterpret their outcomes accordingly. Cohen,1 in the classic 
article “The Earth Is Round (p < .05),” summed up this confusion by concluding 
that signifi cance testing “does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much 
want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless 
believe that it does!”(p997)
Readers might also wonder what is sacred about P < .05. The answer is noth-
ing. Fisher,2 the statistician and geneticist who championed the P value, correctly 
asserted that it was a measure of strength of evidence against the null hypothesis 
and that “we shall not often go astray if we draw a conventional line at 0.05”.(p80) It 
was not Fisher’s intention that P < .05 be used as an absolute decision rule. Indeed, 
he would almost certainly have endorsed the suggestion of Rosnow and Rosenthal 
that “surely God loves the 0.06 nearly as much as 0.05.”3(p1277)
Regardless of how the P value is interpreted, hypothesis testing is illogical, 
because the null hypothesis of no relationship or no difference is always false—there 
are no truly zero effects in nature. Indeed, in arriving at a problem statement and 
research question, researchers usually have good reasons to believe that effects will 
be different from zero. The more relevant issue is not whether there is an effect 
but how big it is. Unfortunately, the P value alone provides us with no information 
about the direction or size of the effect or, given sampling variability, the range of 
feasible values. Depending, inter alia, on sample size and variability, an outcome 
statistic with P < .05 could represent an effect that is clinically, practically, or 
mechanistically irrelevant. Conversely, a nonsignifi cant result (P > .05) does not 
necessarily imply that there is no worthwhile effect, because a combination of 
small sample size and large measurement variability can mask important effects. 
An overreliance on P values might therefore lead to unethical errors of interpreta-
tion. As Rozeboom4 stated, “Null-hypothesis signifi cance testing is surely the most 
bone-headedly misguided procedure ever institutionalized in the rote training of 
science students.”(p35)
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Confi dence Intervals
In response to these and other critiques of hypothesis testing, confi dence intervals 
are beginning to appear in research reports. The strict defi nition of the confi dence 
interval is hotly debated, but most if not all statisticians would agree that it is the 
range within which we would expect the value of the statistic to fall if we were 
to repeat the study with a very large sample. More simply, it is the likely range of 
the true, real, or population value of the statistic. For example, consider a 2-group 
comparison of means in which we observe a mean difference of 10 units, with a 
95% confi dence interval of 6 to 14 units (or lower and upper confi dence limits of 6 
and 14 units). In plain language, we can say that the true difference between groups 
could be somewhere between 6 and 14 units, where could refers to the probability 
used for the confi dence interval.
A confi dence interval alone or in conjunction with a P value still does not 
overtly address the question of the clinical, practical, or mechanistic importance of 
an outcome. Given the meaning of the confi dence interval, an intuitively obvious 
way of dealing with magnitude of an outcome statistic is to inspect the magnitudes 
covered by the confi dence interval and thereby make a statement about how big 
or small the true value could be. The simplest scale of magnitudes we could use 
has 2 values: positive and negative for statistics such as correlation coeffi cients, 
differences in means and differences in frequencies, or greater than unity and less 
than unity for ratio statistics such as relative risks. If we apply the confi dence 
interval for an outcome statistic to such a 2-level scale of magnitudes, we can make 
1 of 3 inferences: The statistic could only be positive, the statistic could only be 
negative, or the statistic could be positive and negative. The fi rst 2 inferences are 
equivalent to the value of the statistic being statistically signifi cantly positive and 
statistically signifi cantly negative, respectively, whereas the third is equivalent to 
the value of the statistic being statistically nonsignifi cant. We illustrate these 3 
inferences in Figure 1.
This equivalence of confi dence intervals and statistical signifi cance is a well-
known corollary of statistical fi rst principles, and we will not explain it further 
here, but we stress that confi dence intervals do not represent an advance on null-
hypothesis testing if they are interpreted only in relation to positive and negative 
values or, equivalently, the zero, or null, value.
Figure 1 — Only 3 inferences can be drawn when the possible magnitudes represented 
by the likely range in the true value of an outcome statistic (the confi dence interval, shown 
by horizontal bars) are determined by referring to a 2-level (positive and negative) scale 
of magnitudes.
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Magnitude-Based Inferences
The problem with a 2-level scale of magnitude is that some positive and negative 
values are too small to be important in a clinical, practical, or mechanistic sense. The 
simplest solution to this problem is use a 3-level scale of magnitude: substantially 
positive, trivial, and substantially negative, defi ned by the smallest important posi-
tive and negative values of the statistic. In Figure 2 we illustrate a crude approach 
to the various magnitude-based inferences for a statistic with substantial values 
that are clinically benefi cial or harmful.
There is no argument about the inferences shown in Figure 2 for confi dence 
intervals that lie entirely within 1 of the 3 levels of magnitude (harmful, trivial, and 
benefi cial). For example, the outcome is clearly harmful if the confi dence interval 
is entirely within the harmful range, because the true value could only be harmful 
(where could only be refers to a probability somewhat more than the probability 
level of the confi dence interval). A confi dence interval that spans all 3 levels is also 
relatively easy to deal with: The true value could be harmful and benefi cial, so the 
outcome is unclear, and we would need to do more research with a larger sample 
or with better measures to resolve the uncertainty. But how do we deal with a con-
fi dence interval that spans 2 levels—harmful and trivial, or trivial and benefi cial? 
In such cases the true value could be harmful and trivial but not benefi cial, or it 
could be trivial and benefi cial but not harmful. Situations like these are bound to 
arise, because a true value is sometimes close to the smallest important value, and 
even a narrow confi dence interval will sometimes overlap trivial and important 
values. It would therefore be a mistake to conclude that the outcome was unclear. 
For example, a confi dence interval that spans benefi cial and trivial values is clear 
in the sense that the true value could not be harmful.
Figure 2 — Four different inferences can be drawn when the possible magnitudes repre-
sented by the confi dence interval are determined by referring crudely to a 3-level (benefi cial, 
trivial, and harmful) scale of magnitudes.
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One option for dealing with a confi dence interval that spans 2 regions is to 
make the inference not harmful, but the reader will then be in doubt as to which of 
the other 2 outcomes (trivial or benefi cial) is more likely. A preferable alternative 
is to declare the outcome as having the magnitude of the observed effect, because 
in almost all studies the true value will be more likely to have this magnitude than 
either of the other 2 magnitudes. Furthermore, there is an understandable tendency 
for researchers to interpret the observed value as if it were the true value.
We regard the approach summarized in Figure 2 as crude, because it does 
not distinguish between outcomes with confi dence intervals that span a single 
magnitude level and those that start to overlap into another level. Furthermore, the 
researcher can make incorrect inferences comparable to the type 1 and type 2 errors 
of null-hypothesis testing: An outcome inferred to be benefi cial could be trivial or 
harmful in reality (a type 1 error), and an outcome inferred to be trivial or harmful 
could be benefi cial (a type 2 error). We therefore favor the more sophisticated and 
informative approach illustrated in Figure 3, in which we qualify clear outcomes 
with a descriptor5 that represents the likelihood that the true value will have the 
observed magnitude. The resulting inferences are content-rich and would surely 
qualify for what Cohen referred to as “what we want to know.” They are also free 
of the burden of type 1 and type 2 errors. An article in the current issue of this 
journal features this approach.6
The inferences shown in Figure 3 are still incomplete, because they refer to 
only 1 of the 3 magnitudes that an outcome could have, and they simplify the 
likelihoods into qualitative ranges. For studies with only 1 or 2 outcome statistics, 
researchers could go 1 step farther by showing the exact probabilities that the true 
effect is harmful, trivial, and benefi cial in some abbreviated manner (eg, 2%, 22%, 
Figure 3 — In a more informative approach to a 3-level scale of magnitudes, inferences 
are qualifi ed with the likelihood that the true value will have the observed magnitude of 
the outcome statistic. Numbers shown are the quantitative chances (%) that the true value 
is harmful, trivial, or benefi cial.
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and 76%, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3), then discussing the outcome 
using the appropriate qualitative terms for 1 or more of the 3 magnitudes (eg, very 
unlikely harmful, unlikely trivial, probably benefi cial). Hopkins and colleagues 
have experimented with this approach in recent publications.6-9 For more than 
a few outcome statistics, this level of detail will produce a cluttered report that 
might overwhelm the reader. Nevertheless, the researcher will have to calculate the 
quantitative probabilities for every statistic in order to provide the reader with only 
the qualitative descriptors. Statistical packages do not produce these probabilities 
and descriptors without special programming, but spreadsheets are available to 
produce them from the observed value of the outcome statistic, its P value, and the 
smallest important value of the statistic (see http://newstats.org/generalize.html) 
or from raw data in straightforward controlled trials.10
The quantitative approach to likelihoods of benefi t, triviality, and harm can be 
further enriched by dividing the range of substantial values into more fi nely graded 
magnitudes. Cohen11(pp24,83) devised default thresholds for dividing values of various 
outcome statistics into trivial, small, moderate, and large. Use of these or modifi ed 
thresholds (see http://newstats.org/effectmag.html) allows the researcher to make 
informative inferences about even unclear effects; for example, “although the effect 
is unclear, any benefi t or harm is at most small.” Compare this statement with “the 
effect is not statistically signifi cant” or “there is no effect (P > .05).”
Other Approaches to Inferences
Authors who promote the use of confi dence intervals usually encourage research-
ers in an informal fashion to interpret the importance of the magnitudes repre-
sented by the interval.eg,12,13 We also found several who advocate calculating the 
chances of clinical benefi t using a value for the minimum worthwhile effect,14,15 
but we know of only 1 published attempt by mainstream statisticians or research-
ers to formalize the inference process in anything like the way we describe here. 
Guyatt et al16 argued that a study result can be considered positive and defi nitive 
only if the confi dence interval is entirely in the benefi cial region. This position 
is understandable for expensive treatments in health-care settings, but in general 
we believe it is too conservative. We also believe that the 95% level is too con-
servative for the confi dence interval; the 90% level is a better default, because the 
chances that the true value lies below the lower limit or above the upper limit are 
both 5%, which we interpret as very unlikely.5 A 90% level also makes it more 
diffi cult for readers to reinterpret a study in terms of statistical signifi cance.17 In 
any case, a fi nal decision about acting on an outcome should be made on the basis 
of the quantitative chances of benefi t, triviality, and harm, taking into account the 
cost of implementing a treatment or other strategy, the cost of making the wrong 
decision, the possibility of individual responses to the treatment (see below), and 
the possibility of harmful side effects. For example, the ironic “what have we got 
to lose?” would be the appropriate attitude toward an inexpensive treatment that 
is almost certainly not harmful, possibly trivial, and possibly benefi cial (0.3%, 
55%, and 45%, respectively), provided there is little chance of harmful individual 
responses and harmful side effects.
Some readers will be surprised to learn that there is a thriving statistical counter-
culture founded on probabilistic assertions about true values. Bayesian statisticians, 
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as they are known, make an inference about the true value of a statistic by combining 
the value from a study with an estimate of a probability distribution representing the 
researcher’s belief about the true value before the study.eg,18 Bayesians contend that 
this approach replicates the way we assimilate evidence, but quantifying prior belief 
is a major hurdle.18 Meta-analysis provides a more objective quantitative way to 
combine a study with other evidence, although the evidence has to be published and 
of suffi cient standard. The approach we have presented here is essentially Bayesian 
but with a “fl at prior”; that is, we make no prior assumption about the true value. 
The approach is easily applied to the outcome of a meta-analysis.
Where to From Here?
Some researchers may argue that making an inference about magnitude requires an 
arbitrary and subjective decision about the value of the smallest important effect, 
whereas hypothesis testing is more scientifi c and objective. We would counter that 
the default scales of magnitude promulgated by Cohen are objective in the sense 
that they are defi ned by the data and that for situations in which Cohen’s scales do 
not apply, the researcher has to justify the choice of the smallest important effect. 
We concur with Kirk19 that researchers themselves are in the best position to justify 
the choice and that dealing with this issue should be an ethical obligation. In any 
case, magnitudes are implicit even in a study designed around hypothesis testing, 
because estimating sample size for such a study requires a value for the smallest 
important effect, along with an arbitrary choice of type I and type II statistical 
error rates (usually 5% and 20%, respectively, corresponding to an 80% chance 
of statistical signifi cance at the 5% level for the smallest effect). Studies designed 
for magnitude-based inferences will need a new approach to sample-size estima-
tion based on acceptable uncertainty. A draft spreadsheet has been devised for this 
purpose and will be presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American College 
of Sports Medicine.20 Sample sizes are approximately one third of those based on 
hypothesis testing, for what seems to be reasonably acceptable uncertainty.
Making an inference about magnitudes is no easy task: It requires justifi ca-
tion of the smallest worthwhile effect, extra analysis that stats packages do not yet 
provide by default, a more thoughtful and often diffi cult discussion of the outcome, 
and sometimes an unsuccessful fi ght with reviewers and the editor. On the other 
hand, it is all too easy for a researcher to inspect the P value that every statistical 
package generates and then declare that either there is or there is not an effect. We 
might therefore have to wait a decade or two before the tipping point is reached and 
magnitude-based inferences in one form or another displace hypothesis testing. We 
will need the help of the gatekeepers of knowledge—peer reviewers of manuscripts 
and funding proposals, journal editors, ethics-committee representatives, funding-
committee members—to remove the shackles of hypothesis testing and to embrace 
more enlightened approaches based on meaningful magnitudes.
A fi nal few words of caution. . . . Statistical signifi cance, confi dence limits, 
and magnitude-based inferences all relate to the 1 and only true or population 
value of a statistic, not to the value for an individual in that population. Thus, a 
large-enough sample can show that a treatment is, for example, almost certainly 
benefi cial, yet the treatment can be trivial or even harmful to a substantial propor-
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tion of the population because of individual responses. We are exploring ways of 
making magnitude-based inferences about individuals.21
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